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INTRODUCTION
Almost as if a young mother had left her newborn child in a bas-
ket on the city's doorstep, I first noticed the bouncing baby of a news-
paper on the ground outside the 22nd Street subway-surface station
before my early morning ride to school. Tightly bundled against nu-
merous other copies of the color tabloid, the newspaper's flag effec-
tively doubled as a pinned note addressed to the newspaper's finders.
Name? TPI Metro PA, or Metro for short. Date of birth? Monday,
January 24, 2000. Birthplace? Philadelphia.
In August 1999, Metro's parents-the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA) and publisher Transit Publications
Inc., Metro PA ("TPI Metro PA")-had entered into a contract provid-
ing for SEPTA's exclusive distribution of Metro in SEPTA's paid areas,
including platforms, buses, and trains.' Because these areas were ex-
pressly off limits to all other newspapers, Metro would, for all intents
and purposes, gain a captive audience of transit riders at the expense
* With all due apologies to the 1974 and 1975 Stanley Cup champion Philadelphia
Flyers, the original "Broad Street Bullies."
' B.A. 1999, J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to
Carrie Y. Flaxman for her tremendous assistance in locating documents crucial to the
writing of this Comment. I would like to acknowledge Professor Seth F. Kreimer for
his preliminary guidance and Professor Sarah Barringer Gordon for her invaluable en-
couragement, contagious enthusiasm, and boundless wisdom. I thank my parents,
Marc and Ellen Mugmon, for their love and support, as well as my brother Matt for
ensuring that journalistic ethics are alive and well. Finally, I express my gratitude to
the editors of Volume 150 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their dili-
gence and professionalism on this piece and indeed on all others throughout the year.
See Agreement for Rider Publications between Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority and Transit Publications Inc., Metro PA 11-12 (Aug. 5, 1999) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Agreement for Rider Publications] ("[I]nitial distribu-
tion will focus on the heavily traveled high speed lines[,] ... commuter rail [lines,] ...
subway-surface trolleys .... buses[,] ... [and] stations.").
(1969)
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of established newspapers' readership-a valuable commodity in the
late twentieth century's shrinking newspaper market.2 Fearing per-
haps that Philadelphians would adopt Metro as their own and lavish
their attentions-and precious advertising dollars-on it, the City of
Brotherly Love's established media conglomerates did not take kindly
to their upstart sibling.
Three days before Metro's parents introduced their newspaper to
the city, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., The New York Times Co., and
the Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (which publishes USA
Today and The Reporter of Lansdale, Pennsylvania), filed suit against
one of Metro's parents-SEPTA-in United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.3 Arguing that SEPTA's contract
with TPI Metro PA to "distribute a SEPTA-sponsored newspaper in ar-
eas in which no other newspapers are permitted to be distributed, vio-
lates the First... Amendment," the news organizations sought a tem-
porary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to prevent
the government agency from distributing the new publication.4 The
publishers also charged that the contract gave SEPTA unconstitu-
tional editorial control over the newspaper's content,5 and that it bur-
2 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Fissures in Sunday Papers' Pot of Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2000, at CI (reporting a marked decline in nationwide Sunday newspaper circula-
tion and an 11% decline in weekday circulation since 1987); Chronicle Now Sixth-
Largest Daily, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4, 2001, Business, at 3 (showing an 8.6% de-
crease in average Philadelphia Inquirerweekday circulation from 392,438 to 358,801 dur-
ing a one-year period ending September 30, 2001). Although the September 11, 2001,
terror attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., produced an immediate bump
in national circulation numbers, the news events did not give national newspaper cir-
culation a long-term shot in the arm. CompareValerie Block, Media Hold Most of Sept. 11
Gains, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Dec. 3, 2001, at 3 (remarking that the three months following
the attacks saw a major spike in circulation numbers for New York newspapers, coun-
tering a nationwide circulation dip over the past decade), and David Lieberman, Na-
tion Returns to Traditional News Outlets for Information, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2001, at 6B
(speculating on an increase in circulation numbers after a huge jump in newsstand
sales), with Gretchen A. Kirby, Looking Back, Looking Ahead: Uncertainties in the Paper
Market Cause Print Buyers to Watch and Wait, PRINT MEDIA, Nov. 1, 2001, at 18 (quoting a
paper company executive who "anticipate[s] a continued weakness in our order book
for the fourth quarter" despite "an apparent temporary increase in newspaper circula-
tion ... in the wake of the tragic events of September 11"), and Newspapers' Circulation
Figures Show Mixed Bag, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Oct. 30, 2001, at 4D (reporting that
four of Texas' five largest newspapers experienced circulation declines over the past
year, while national numbers were varied).
Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary Re-
straining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 1, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E. Pa.
Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with author).
4 Id. at 2-3.
See id. at 11, 19 (contending that SEPTA's requirement of editorial control con-
BROADSHEET BULLIES
dened their constitutional right to distribute and circulate newspa-
pers." Most intriguing, the newspapers suggested that SEPTA poten-
tially created a designated public forum "by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse [to Metro]."7 If SEPTA in-
deed fashioned a designated public forum on platforms and in transit
vehicles, the government agency could not exclude other newspapers
constitutionally unless the distribution restriction was content-neutral,
served a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve thatS ° 8
interest, and left open substantial other means for communication.
Holding that the publishers had "failed to satisfy their burden of
demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability of success on the
merits and that Plaintiffs will suffer immediate and irreparable harm,"
U.S. District Court Judge Robert F. Kelly quickly denied the publish-
ers' request.9 The newspapers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit and concurrently asked Judge Kelly for a tempo-
rary restraining order pending the appeal of his initial injunction de-
nial-a request he denied on February 2, 2000.10 Nearly three weeks
later, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals denied the newspa-
pers' request to bar SEPTA temporarily from distributing Metro in ar-
eas forbidden to other publications." The combatants lay dormant-
stitutes unconstitutional invidious viewpoint discrimination).
6 See id. at 16 ("SEPTA-a state actor---cannot burden plaintiffs' exercise of their
constitutional right to distribute their newspapers by having a preferential scheme that
accords greater distribution rights to one newspaper over [another newspaper] unless
SEPTA can meet its burden to justify its action."). See generally Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (holding unconstitutional a state law regulating and inhibit-
ing circulation of materials).
7 Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary Re-
straining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 27, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E.
Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with author) (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
8 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(outlining standards for constitutional speech restrictions in traditional and desig-
nated public forums); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (same); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 535-36 (1980) (same).
9 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 00-392 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
2000) (order denying preliminary injunction).
10 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 00-392, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1160, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2000) (denying temporary restraining order pend-
ing appeal of the district court's initial preliminary injunction denial). Although
Judge Kelly cited "strongly contested factual issues" in denying the injunction, id. at *3,
he declined to discuss any constitutional issues in making the decision.
11 Joseph A. Slobodzian, Newspapers' Appeal Is Rejected, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 23,
2000, at C2 (reporting that the Third Circuit panel, in a one-sentence order, denied
the newspapers' request for an injunction to halt the distribution of Metro).
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waiting for the district court to hear the case on its merits-until No-
vember 5, 2001, when SEPTA and the publishers reached an out-of-
court settlement ending the dispute.12 Under the terms of the agree-
ment, SEPTA may not give Metro any distribution preference on its
property, except on buses, for eighteen months; should SEPTA want
to afford Metro special distribution treatment following the expiration
of that eighteen-month window, the agency must give the newspapers
ninety days' notice or face the prospect of a renewed legal challenge.3
Nonetheless, the out-of-court settlement did not constitutionally ratify
SEPTA's actions, and no court has ever debated the constitutional
merits of the case.
Although the newspapers' publishers invoked grand and right-
eous First Amendment tenets in their briefs, 4 this Comment focuses
on a distinct-and possibly dispositive-aspect of First Amendment
jurisprudence: public forum doctrine, and specifically the designated
public forum doctrine.
More specifically, this Comment discusses the public forum doc-
trine and how it pertains to a deal between a public transit system and
a private newspaper. Part I will explore how and why SEPTA inked a
distribution deal with a private media organization. This portion first
addresses SEPTA's motives for distributing a newspaper throughout
its system, as well as the agency's historical approach to regulating ex-
pression, particularly newspaper and handbill distribution. An analy-
sis of two recent agency-specific cases that directly pertain to public
forums and expression within the SEPTA system prove helpful in un-
derstanding the approach SEPTA took in inking a distribution deal.'5
This Part then progresses to the agency-promulgated SEPTA Rules Re-
12Joann Loviglio, Philadelphia Transit Tabloid and Newspapers Reach Settlement on Dis-
tribution, AP, Nov. 5, 2001, Westlaw (detailing the settlement agreement between
SEPTA and the newspaper publishers).
13 See id. (describing in full the settlement terms).
14 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 16, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E.
Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with author) (arguing
that SEPTA cannot burden the plaintiffs' exercise of their constitutional right to dis-
tribute their newspapers by granting Metro preferential distribution rights unless
SEPTA can justify its action under the First Amendment, which SEPTA cannot do).
15 See Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248-52
(3d Cir. 1998) (determining that SEPTA created a designated public forum in its ad-
vertising space); Storti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14515, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999) (applying the SEPTA Rules Relating to Constitu-
tionally Protected Activities to pamphlet distribution on station platforms, and holding
SEPTA station platforms to be nonpublic forums), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001)
(unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002).
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lating to Constitutionally Protected Activities,1 6 which govern the regula-
tion of expressive conduct in paid areas and on platforms, and which
were developed in response to constitutional challenges to SEPTA's
expression policies. Finally, Part I will probe the details of the con-
tract between SEPTA and TPI Metro PA, which simultaneously at-
tempts both to satisfy the SEPTA Rules Relating to Constitutionally Pro-
tected Activities and to circumvent them.
Part II investigates public forum doctrine generally and desig-
nated public forum more specifically, looking into how a government
agency transforms a nonpublic forum into a designated public forum.
In Part III, this Comment analyzes how the designated public forum
doctrine might have been applied in the SEPTA scenario, and more
broadly, how it should apply in situations where a government agency
has teamed up with a private newspaper in exclusive distribution
deals. In this final Part, the Comment also touches on public policy
concerns regarding a court's finding that a government agency cre-
ated a designated public forum by signing an exclusive distribution
deal.
This Comment, however, does not look into the constitutionality
of a government contracting with a private newspaper; it focuses only
on public forum issues once a government agency and private pub-
lisher have completed the deal. Metro has enjoyed tremendous success
abroad and in Philadelphia thus far,17 and it is assumed for the pur-
poses of this Comment that the American subsidiary of Metro's pub-
lisher could have financially withstood a court challenge yielding an
adverse result and continued to print. It is further assumed that its
publisher will seek to expand into other American markets and will
face similar fights.18 Thus, this Comment centers around what hap-
16 See S.E. PA. TRANSP. AUTH., SEPTA RULES RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED ACTIVITIES 1 (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter SEPTA RULES]
(regulating expressive activities on SEPTA property).
7 See Karen Abbott, Metro Celebrates Its First Anniversary, PHILA. WKLY., Jan. 31,
2001, at 14 ("[T]he paper has seemingly accomplished what it set out to do: become
the newspaper of choice for people not accustomed to reading newspapers."). Despite
the fact that Metro lost $8.8 million in fiscal year 2000, its parent company chalked up
the loss to the "early stage of development at the newspaper" and reported a fourth-
quarter net sales increase of 21.7%. Free Commuter Newspaper Loses $8.8M, PHILA. BUS.
J., Feb. 2, 2001, available at http://philadelphia.bcentral.com/philadelphia/stories/
2001/02/19/dailyl4.html.
is Indeed, a Boston edition of Metro was launched on May 3, 2001, but the Massa-
chusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) declined to link up with the upstart to
provide for distribution on platforms and in paid areas. See Metro Hits Boston Market,
PHILA. BUS. J., May 2, 2001 ("The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority refused
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pens when the deal is done; the issue then becomes whether, once a
public transit system has agreed to an exclusive distribution deal,
other newspaper publishers have the constitutional right to distribute
and circulate their publications in areas expressly off-limits to outside
newspapers.
Before delving into the history behind the arrangement, one
should ask: Why does designated public forum doctrine even matter
with regard to these deals? The initial application of the public forum
doctrine in this realm will almost certainly dictate how courts will view
exclusive distribution deals between private publications and public
transit systems (if not all government agencies) across the nation.
When one considers that the newspapers' suit against SEPTA indi-
rectly headed off a deal between Metro and the Massachusetts Bay
Transit Authority in Boston, 9 and that Metro's handlers tentatively
plan to expand into public transit systems in New York City, Chicago,
and San Francisco,20 the significance of these deals becomes substan-
tially more evident. A victory for Metro in any jurisdiction would essen-
tially mean that the newspaper's publisher would likely face minimal
subsequent legal challenges in striking exclusive distribution deals
with other public transit systems. Not only would the result set a sym-
bolic legal standard for the purposes of persuasive authority, but a
transportation agency victory would undoubtedly raise the ire of na-
tional media conglomerates,2 1 whose monopolistic newspapers22 would
face competition that could result in the loss of precious readership.
23
a deal with Metro, perhaps affected by a lawsuit brought against SEPTA by [four pub-
lishers], which objected to the distribution of Metro through SEPTA stations and vehi-
cles."), available at http://philadelphia.bcentral.com/philadelphia/stories/2001/04/
30/daily30.html; Gabriel Spitzer, A Year Old, Metro Has Yet to Wow Philadelphia, MEDIA
LIFE, Feb. 16, 2001 (reporting that "ethical issues involved in distributing newspaper to
a captive audience of commuters" likely spooked the MBTA out of teaming up with
Metro), available at http://www.medialifemagazine.com/news2001/febO1/febl2/5-fri/
news3Friday.html.
19 See supra note 18 (detailing the Boston expansion story).
20 See Doug Donovan, Coming to America, FORBES, May 29, 2000, at 70, 70 (discuss-
ing Metro's publisher's plans to expand into other markets); Judge Refuses to Stop Distri-
bution of Metro, PA. L. WKLY., Jan. 31, 2000, at 2 (relating that Metro's parent company
is eyeing other American public transit systems for distribution).21 See Donovan, supra note 20, at 70 (quoting a Metro attorney who believed that
"[the] case [was] less about lofty First Amendment principles than economic bully-
ing").
22 See CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 107 (2000) ("[M]ost newspapers... enjoy a monopoly status in
their ceographical areas.").
23 See Barringer, supra note 2 (reporting faltering national newspaper circulation
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Because SEPTA's sponsorship of one newspaper to the exclusion of all
others represents the first time a government agency has effectively
controlled a private newspaper, the Philadelphia deal is utterly
novel-and utterly important insofar as public forum doctrine is con-
cerned, for the Supreme Court has never applied forum analysis to
24the platforms and paid areas of a public transit system.
I. ON DEEP BACKGROUND
A. SEPTA 's Historical Approach to Restricting Expression
Established by the Pennsylvania Urban Mass Transportation Law,25
SEPTA is the country's fifth-largest public transportation system. 2 ;
Serving "nearly one million" commuters daily throughout the 2200-
square-mile, five-county metropolitan area, the government agency
reigns over public transportation in Philadelphia and its surround-
ings, providing extensive bus, subway, regional rail, subway-surface
281trolley, and paratransit service. With such a broad service area and
large ridership base, SEPTA unquestionably has a deep interest in en-
suring its riders' safe passage from one destination to another.5
numbers). Media tycoon Mort Zuckerman briefly published the free Daily News Express
in New York City in 2001 as "a strategy... to head off a possible invasion into New
York by [Metro's publisher], which has had great success publishing editions of the free
commuter daily Metro in cities throughout Europe." Jeff Bercovici, Mort KOs Free Daily
News Express, MEDIA LIFE, Sept. 20, 2001, available at http://
www.medialifemagazine.com/news200l/sepol/sepl 7/4_thurs/news2thursday.html.
Zuckerman retired the Metro copycat--distributed during the afternoon and outside of
major city transportation hubs-when the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center destroyed the distribution site for nearly 20,000 copies of the
newspaper (providing approximately one-fifth of its circulation). Id.
Indeed, the high Court has never directly applied public forum analysis to the
core of a subway or rail system. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-04
(1974), however, the Court discussed the question of advertising space on the side of
city buses. Also, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
680-85 (1992), may serve as a potentially relevant analogy, as the Court addressed air-
port terminals in light of the public forum doctrine.
25 74 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1701-1785 (1994).
26 See Transportation, at http://www.philadex.com/trasnportation.asp [sic] (last
visited Apr. 28, 2002) (providing general information regarding area transit service).
27 Id.
28 See id. (describing SEPTA services to prospective employees).
29 See SEIA Five Year Plan for Strategic Change, at http://www.septa.org/
reports/5year.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) (outlining SEPTA's plans for improving
customer safety); see also Special Safety Message ftom SEPTA General Managerj Leay (Oct.
4, 2001) (reassuring riders made nervous by the September 11 terrorist attacks that
"providing you with safe transportation each day remains our top priority"), available at
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With such a sentiment in mind, SEPTA officials have long prohib-
ited newspaper sales on platforms and in the so-called "paid areas" of
SEPTA property.30 Traditionally invoking a safety rationale, the
agency has always forbidden "hawkers"-walking newspaper salespeo-
ple-from soliciting sales on transit vehicles and banned newsracks
and newspaper boxes outright from both vehicles and paid areas. 1
Indeed, SEPTA has emerged victorious in several cases challenging its
expression regulations by arguing that the agency's "primary func-
tion" is not to "provide for expressive activities," but rather to main-
tain passenger safety and to move riders through the system effi-
ciently
12
However, in Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, the first of two recent cases to object to
SEPTA's expression policies, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found that SEPTA violated an adver-
tiser's First Amendment rights when the agency removed a particu-
larly graphic anti-abortion poster from advertising space in SEPTA's
Suburban Station in Center City Philadelphia.3 The court agreed
with Christ's Bride's assertion that SEPTA's advertising space amounts
to a designated public forum; thus, the agency may only regulate the
space through time, place, and manner restrictions and only if those
restrictions are content neutral, survive strict scrutiny, and leave open
http://www.septa.org/news/20011004-20011231-2267.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
Not only does SEPTA have a policy interest in protecting its riders, but the agency also
has a strong economic interest in safety. SEPTA recently agreed to pay $250,000 to the
family of a twelve-year-old boy killed on July 11, 2001, when he leaned out of a subway
window and hit his head on a pole. See SEPTA Agrees to Pay Family After Boy's Death on
Train, AP, Westlaw, Dec. 7, 2001 (recounting the incident). On December 15, 1999, a
jury declared that SEPTA must pay $51 million to a mother and her four-year-old son,
whose foot was ripped off in a gruesome escalator accident at a SEPTA subway station.
$51 Million Jury Award Against SEPTA, PA. L. WKLY., Dec. 20, 1999, at 2; Claudia N. Gi-
nanni, Documents Uncovered Mid-Trial Fuel $51 Million Injury Verdict vs. SEPTA, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 15, 1999, at 1.
30 See Shannon P. Duffy, Newspapers Challenge SEPTA's Deal with Metro, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 24, 2000, at 5 (highlighting SEPTA's tight restrictions on station
and vehicle activities); Storti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14515, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999) (remarking on SEPTA's historical ban on
distribution activities in "paid areas," places in which a rider would have to pay to gain
access), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002).
s See Duffy, supra note 30 (explaining SEPTA's past policies on newspaper circula-
tion).
32 Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *9.
33 See 148 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that the forum at issue is
SEPTA's advertising space).
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ample alternate channels for communications. Although the case
clearly does not involve newspaper distribution, its outcome not only
affects how courts will apply public forum doctrine to SEPTA's expres-
sion restrictions, but the ruling against SEPTA-as well as a number of
prior challenges to the agency's practices concerning expressive activi-
ties3 5-indirectly led the agency to promulgate a series of guidelines
for agency regulation of expressive conduct.
36
B. How SEPTA Responded to Constitutional Challenges: SEPTA Rules
Relating to Constitutionally Protected Activities
On January 27, 1999, those guidelines arrived in the form of the
SEPTA Rules Relating to Constitutionally Protected Activities.17  Realizing
the need to "address requests to engage in commercial and non-
commercial activities on the SEPTA system, in a fashion not inconsis-
tent with Constitutional guarantees," u former SEPTA General Man-
ager John K. LearyJr. and other agency officials provisionally decided
to allow a limited set of expressive activities on SEPTA property.39 Not
surprisingly, even such limited permitted conduct was accompanied
by further ideological and policy-based restrictions-namely that no
activity could unreasonably interfere with SEPTA's "primary function
34 See id. at 252 (ruling that SEPTA's advertising space constitutes a designated
public forum); see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-46 (1983) (outlining standards for constitutional speech restrictions in traditional
and designated public forums); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (same); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980) (same).
35 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 4, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E.
Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 00-392 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (on file with author) (listing
previous First Amendment challenges to SEPTA's expression rules).
SEPTA RULES, supra note 16. The adverse outcome for SEPTA in Christ's Bride
served as an impetus for the release of the Rules. In fact, the document had been in
the works since the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled a
1989 agreement establishing generally applicable rules for expressive conduct (espe-
cially leafleting) unenforceable. See Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *6-8 (relat-
ing the evolution of SEPTA policy concerning expressive activities); see also Frantz v.
N.E. Commuter Servs. Corp., No. 97-6631, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22764, at *12-15
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1998) (declaring a previous series of generally applicable rules relat-
ing to expressive conduct as unenforceable).
37 SEPTA RULES, supra note 16.
38 Memorandum from John K. LearyJr. to General Manager's Staff (Jan. 27, 1999)
(on file with author) (explaining reasons for promulgating the Rules Relating to Consti-
tutionally Protected Activities).
39 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 1 (setting forth a "Statement of Rationale"
for the Rules). *
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to provide a fast, reliable, and economical transportation system" and
"service that is accessible, affordable, safe, reliable, clean and cus-
tomer-focused." 4° Almost certainly anticipating further constitutional
challenges, the Rules' framers went so far as to interpret and apply the
Rules in the context of fourteen "important and compelling govern-
mental interests of SEPTA,"41 most of which revolve around ensuring
passenger safety and security, as well as preserving an orderly flow of
traffic through stations and aboard transit vehicles.42 More specifi-
cally, the Rules completely ban handbilling and subject newspaper
sales to extremely heavy regulation, requiring permits for distribution
in unpaid areas.4 " Although not exactly a rousing espousal of First
Amendment ideals, the Rules nonetheless moved SEPTA from a posi-
tion of absolute prohibition to one of tentative permission.
C. Testing the New Rules
With SEPTA's having opened this small hole, Nicholas Storti and
Michael Perez attempted to leap through it. Storti and Perez filed suit
to challenge the agency's newest prohibitions on handbilling on plat-form andin " 44
forms and in paid areas. As in the Christ's Bride case, the situation did
not involve newspaper distribution; Storti and Perez passed out relig-
40 Id.
41 Id. The Court also has stated:
Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of
the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a
traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are
permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effec-
tuate a compelling state interest.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) ("When government regulation discriminates
among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause man-
dates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests and the
justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.");
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 208 (1992) (discussing scrutiny
levels for speech infringement).
42 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 1-3 (cataloguing compelling interests for use
by courts in applying strict scrutiny to restrictions in a public forum).
43 Id. at 6-7 (addressing circulation restrictions). The Rules conspicuously mention
nothing about newspaper distribution in paid areas, strongly suggesting that SEPTA
would roundly deny permit applications for newsracks and newspaper boxes in those
special places.
44 See Storti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999), at *1 (explaining plaintiffs' contention in broad terms), aff'd,
265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1073
(2002).
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ious literature on SEPTA property and sought to continue the prac-
tice.45 However, as opposed to Christ's Bride, the court had the oppor-
tunity to review the constitutionality of one provision of the SEPTA
Rules (the anti-leafletting regulation) 46 in light of the identical forum
at issue in the controversy between the established newspapers and
SEPTA.47 Asserting that "paid areas and platforms are 'designated
public fora' in which the government may only impose content-
neutral restrictions on expression that are narrowly tailored to serve
an important government interest," Storti and Perez charged that
SEPTA's ban fails this strict test because the "prohibition is facially
over-broad . 48 Essentially, they objected to the handbilling ban on the
grounds that SEPTA intended to (and did) create, at the very least, a
limited public forum by historically allowing Krishnas to distribute
handbills in the contested areas.4 9 The court rejected Storti and
Perez's contentions, holding that although the agency permitted in-
finitesimal exceptions to the expression regulations, SEPTA did not
manifest the requisite intent necessary to turn platforms and paid ar-
eas into designated public forums for leafletting purposes.
50 Instead,
the court reasoned, paid areas and platforms are nonpublic 
forums, 51
under which expression regulations need only qualify as "reason-
45 See id. at *1, *3 (explicating plaintiffs' expressive actions).
46 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 7-9 (banning handbill distribution in paid
areas and on platforms).
47 See Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *3 (suggesting that paid areas and
platforms are designated public forums and thus that SEPTA is limited in its constitu-
tional ability to regulate expressive conduct therein).
48 See id. at *1, *3 (laying out a constitutional rationale for a verdict against
SEPTA).
49 See id. at *24-25 (conveying the plaintiffs' view that SEPTA created a public fo-
rum). Such exceptions are, of course, for less controversial unpaid areas. See SEPTA
RULES, supra note 16, at 7 ("No person shall distribute or attempt to distribute such
material on any platform or in any paid area. ." (emphasis added)). With regard to
the Krishnas, in 1975, SEPTA accepted a consent decree that allowed the International
Society of Krishna Consciousness ("ISKCON") to perform "sankirtan"-the ritual so-
licitation of funds-on all SEPTA property. Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *5.
Following the promulgation of the Rules, SEPTA and ISKCON agreed that the Krish-
nas' actions would fall under the purview of the Rules. See id. at *7 (detailing the de-
mise of SEPTA's two-tiered leafletting rules-one for the Krishnas and one for every-
one else). A full discussion of designated public forum doctrine appears later in this
Comment. Infra Part II.B.
50 See Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *24 (noting that the exception for the
Krishnas does not demonstrate the "government's intent and purpose" to establish a
designated public forum). A lengthy discussion of how the government turns a non-
public forum into a designated public forum follows in Part II.G.
51 See Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *25 (categorizing paid areas and plat-
forms as nonpublic forums).
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able."52 Notwithstanding the fact that the court's decision pertained
only to the handbilling portion of the Rules, one could reasonably in-
fer from this outcome that a court would hold that platforms and paid
areas are not designated public forums for newspaper circulation
purposes. The forum's landscape would change, however, after
SEPTA teamed up with a private media conglomerate to distribute an
agency-sponsored newspaper to the exclusion of all other newspaper.
D. Sowing the Seeds of the Distribution Deal
According to the SEPTA Five Year Plan for Strategic Change,
agency officials quite plainly wanted to "improve customer service"
through "[s]trengthening the lines of communication with the cus-
tomer" and "disseminat[ing] information. 5 ' This goal was merely a
piece of a larger objective to stem the tide of ridership losses between
1988 and 1996 and to control an "escalated operating deficit, calcu-
lated to increase by at least $192 million for the years 1999 through
2003.", 4 Evidently, SEPTA officials intended to do what they could to
reclaim part of the transit service's hemorrhaging ridership and to in-
crease revenues concomitantly. With regard to the agency's expand-
ing deficit, SEPTA officials also presumably feared that SEPTA's al-
ready precarious financial status could grow markedly worse; a
pending suit involving the accidental amputation of a child's foot by a
station escalator meant that the agency would face even greater fiscal
woes if the jury tagged SEPTA for a major money verdict.5
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that SEPTA officials sought
out a publication through which the agency could freely communicate
with passengers, raise revenues, and overhaul its suffering public im-
56age. Publishing a Request for Proposal (RFP) on June 8, 1999, for a
"rider publication" for "on-system distribution," SEPTA pursued a
newspaper or circular that would "promote[] SEPTA services and
52 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.").
53 See SEPTA Five Year Plan for Strategic Change, supra note 29 (illustrating SEPTA's
intent to foster communication between the agency and passengers).
54 See id. (showing overall goals of the plan).
55 See $51 Million Jury Award Against SEPTA, supra note 29 (reporting that a jury
decided that SEPTA must pay a substantial sum to a mother and her son, who lost his
foot in a horrific SEPTA escalator accident).
56 See SEPTA Five Year Plan for Strategic Change, supra note 29 (mentioning the goals
of increasing revenues and improving public relations).
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generate[] revenue through the sale of advertising."5 7 The RFP fur-
ther demanded that "[e] ach issue should provide SEPTA with signifi-
cant editorial coverage and must conform to SEPTA's editorial stan-
dards for content;" more specifically, at least three SEPTA news items
must appear in every issue. 8 SEPTA stated that it would not assume
the costs of production, printing, delivery, or distribution.
' Thus,
when a new corporation, "TPI Metro PA" responded to the RFP,
SEPTA found itself in a highly fortuitous position for two reasons: not
only was TPI Metro PA the lone publisher to respond favorably to the
editorially stifling RFP,60 but it would accede gladly to all of SEPTA's
demands and more-it would pay the agency a kingly sum for the ex-
clusive opportunity to distribute a publication within the walls of the
transit system. 61
E. Sailing to Philadelphia: Sweden's Modern Times Group
Crosses the Atlantic with TPI Metro PA
It is somewhat misleading, however, to classify TPI Metro PA as a
new corporation. Although incorporated in Pennsylvania on May 5,
1999,62 TPI Metro PA actually operates as an American subsidiary of
Modem Times Group (MTG), a powerful Stockholm-based media
conglomerate that deals in virtually every communications medium.
63
Most significantly, since 1995, MTG has published free transit dailies
57 Request for Proposal by Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
(Auq. 5,d1999) [hereinafter Request for Proposal] (on file with author).
59 Id.
60 See Jerry Walker, Philadelphia to Get a New Daily Paper, JACK O'DWYER'S
NEWSLETrER, Nov. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that TPI Metro PA "was the only bidder for
the contract").
61 See Technical Proposal by Transit Publications, Inc., Metro PA 15-16 (Aug. 5,
1999) [hereinafter Technical Proposal] (on file with author) (proposing a generous
revenue and fee structure under which SEPTA would receive at least $45,000 per
month and one full page of space per issue, simply for allowing TPI Metro PA to dis-
tribute Metro throughout the system).
62 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 10, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E.
Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with author) (describ-
ing TPI Metro PA's entry into the American marketplace).
63 Shannon P. Duffy, Judge Refuses to Stop Distribution of Metro, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 25, 2000, at 1 (relating MTG's role in bringing Metro to Philadel-
phia). According to TPI Metro PA's technical proposal, "MTG conducts business in a
variety of media: television; radio; newspaper; magazines; and the Internet as well as
extensive production and distribution services. In 1998, MTG had revenues of $500
million (US)." Technical Proposal, supra note 61, at 2.
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in twenty-two cities spanning fifteen countries, including the United
States with Philadelphia's Metro.4 Beginning with Metro Stockholm in
1995, MTG entered into an arrangement with Stockholm Lokaltrafik,
the city's regional public transportation system, to circulate a free
65daily in the subway system. The venture saw immense success. MTG
since has replicated its initial Stockholm triumph by striking similar
deals with public transit systems in Gothenburg, Prague, Budapest,
and Helsinki, to name but a few.6 Unlike an American public transit
agency, however, none of those transit systems must reconcile an ex-
clusive distribution contract with the First Amendment's public forum
doctrine."' In other words, setting up shop in Philadelphia-MTG's
first American outpost-would not be painless.
F. Metro's Parents Meet: Terms of the Deal and Implications
Ignoring momentarily the vast legal implications of MTG's initial
foray into the United States with Philadelphia's Metro, one must exam-
ine the terms of TPI Metro PA's agreement with SEPTA to produce
and distribute Metro throughout the transit system. At its financial
core, the five-year contract guarantees SEPTA at least $30,000 per
month in shared advertising revenues (plus two percent of annual ad-
justed gross advertising revenues),8 as well as at least $15,000 per
month in cleaning and recycling fees.69 Straddling the line between a
substantive term and a monetary one, the deal also affords SEPTA a
full page in each issue for announcements and news pieces, ostensibly
"to provide public transit information to its riders"; the page's esti-
mated value starts at $1.1 million in the contract's first year, but esca-
64 See Tabloid Dispute Heats Up, PHILA. METRO, Feb. 22-24, 2002 (mentioning Metro's
international pervasiveness); see also Duffy, supra note 63, at I (noting that MTG's pub-
lications spread across Europe and across the Atlantic).
65 See Technical Proposal, supra note 61, at 3 ("Today, Metro Stockholm publishes
260,000 copies six ... days a week for distribution throughout [Stockholm Lokaltra-
fik].").
W See id. at 3-4 (discussing Metro's penetration of several European transit systems).
67 But see Tabloid Dispute Heats Up, supra note 64, at 07 (reporting widespread un-
ion oposition to the means of distribution for a new French edition).
See id. (showing the revenue structure for the SEPTA-TPI Metro PA deal). Addi-
tional revenues "could equal almost $300,000" per year by the end of the five-year deal.
Id.
69 See id. (building clean-up costs into the contract). Both parties wisely speculate
that riders who pick up the newspaper to read on transit vehicles will not necessarily
take it with them when they reach their final destinations, hence the difference be-
tween circulation and readership.
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lates to nearly $2.5 million in year five.7 0 Aside from compensating
SEPTA quite well, what else would TPI Metro PA have to do for the
privilege of gaining exclusive access to the SEPTA system? Each
weekday with the exception of holidays, TPI Metro PA would have to
print and distribute at least 110,000 copies of Metro.
7 As for the for-
mat of Metro itself, the newspaper would not be a traditional broad-
sheet, as are some of its competitors-the Philadelphia Inquirer serving
as the most obvious example. Rather, Metro would exist as a smaller,
twenty-four-page full-color tabloid that contains heavily edited na-
tional newswire articles, skeletal local stories, and splashy graphics, all
meant for consumption during a twenty-five minute commute.
7 2 Of
course, Metro would be absolutely free to all riders
7 3 at its 850 distribu-1 4
tion points, including stations and transit vehicles.
Although these terms alone raise the nasty specter of "a govern-
ment entity['s] tak[ing] control over [a private newspaper's] editorial
content,"7 5 SEPTA's demands for editorial dominion went even fur-
ther. Notwithstanding the complimentary full page SEPTA would re-
ceive each issue (which TPI Metro PA, not SEPTA, suggested), SEPTA
insisted on something far more intangible and far more unsettling:
"significant editorial coverage" of SEPTA itself and external coverage
that "must conform to SEPTA's editorial standards 
for content."76
Holding off again on the constitutional concerns of such an arrange-
ment, one must question seriously the journalistic integrity of a gov-
ernment agency's forcing a private newspaper to adhere to an abstract
70 Id.
71 See id. (detailing circulation figures). Most recently, the Philadelphia Inquirer has
reported Metro's circulation to stand at 150,000 newspapers daily. Slobodzian, supra
note 11.
72 See, e.g.,Jon Shure, Paper, Get YourPaper: All News We Fit to Print, 9 N.J. LAW. 231
(2001) (offering a colorful and concise description of Metro).
73 See Technical Proposal, supra note 61, at 2 ("[TPI Metro PA] proposes to pub-
lish a high quality, free daily transit newspaper designed to be distributed within the
SEPTA system for its commuters.").
74 See Shure, supra note 72, at 231 (reporting the widespread distribution
throughout the SEPTA system).
75 Proceedings at 7, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan.
24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (order denying preliminary injunction) (copy on file with
author).
76 Request for Proposal, supra note 57. The contract nowhere defines or further
explicates what these "standards" are, although it does provide for TPI Metro PA to
"take direction ... from SEPTA's Project Representatives... but.., remain solely pro-
fessionally responsible for the services." Agreement for Rider Publications, supra note
1, at2.
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governmental editorial standard." It may be safe to assume that the
accidental amputation of a four-year-old boy's leg by a SEPTA escala-
tor would not have received the same degree of scrutiny in Metro as it
78did in the traditional Philadelphia press. With regard to Metro's own
coverage of the incident, the newspaper's editors certainly would have
had an incentive to tone down coverage, especially considering that
"coverage ... must conform to SEPTA's editorial standards for con-
tent."7 9 More worrisome under the contract, SEPTA officials theoreti-
cally could force Metro editors to eliminate coverage altogether.
Moreover, they simultaneously could issue propaganda on SEPTA's
own page in an effort to mollify riders' fears and concerns and to mo-
bilize public support for the agency.s° This is, of course, to say noth-
ing of the fact that once SEPTA riders enter the system, they have but
one newspaper from which to choose: Metro.
G. The Issue
Even if SEPTA does control Metro editorially, and even if SEPTA
officials can contractually use one page per issue however they please,
the contractual terms, objectivity problems, and indeed the out-of-
court settlement do not settle the crucial constitutional question of
whether the public transit agency has created a designated public fo-
77 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 4, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E.
Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with author) (intimat-
ing that readers could not trust Metro to be in any way objective in its coverage of
SEPTA).
78 See, e.g., $51 Million Jury Award Against SEPTA, supra note 29 (detailing the ver-
dict and the horrific accident); Ginanni, supra note 29 (same).
79 Request for Proposal, supra note 57.
80 This scenario is hardly farfetched. SEPTA has frequently used its page to trum-
pet its involvement in "Operation Lifesaver," a national program dedicated to rail and
transit safety for school-age youth. See SEPTA Operation Lifesaver, at http://
www.septa.org/reports/lifesaver.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2002) (explaining Opera-
tion Lifesaver's mission and SEPTA's role in furthering it). As recently as November 6,
2000, SEPTA officials seemed to employ spin tactics:
Newspaper articles and television reports from the Philadelphia area and
around the country tell disturbing stories about unfortunate incidents involv-
ing children and railroad tracks. At SEPTA, we are concerned not only with
the safety of our customers, but also our neighbors and the communities that
surround the Authority's vast system. With so many schools and gathering
places adjacent to SEPTA rail lines, we are especially concerned about the
safety of the region's children.
Operation Lifesaver, METRO, Nov. 6, 2000, at 8. Undoubtedly, Operation Lifesaver is a
noble cause, but how should we view SEPTA's intentions in light of previous accidents
and the agency's editorial control of Metro?
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rum. Through the highly restrictive exclusive distribution contract,
SEPTA has potentially engaged in "the business of promoting expres-
sion. When a public transit system enters into an exclusive distribu-
tion contract with a private publisher, and when the agency exerts
control over the publication's content, does the physical system-spe-
cifically, its platforms, paid areas, and transit vehicles-become a des-
ignated public forum such that it may no longer prohibit competing
publishers from selling their newspapers there?
II. A PRIMER ON PUBLIC FORUM
A. Public Forum Doctrine Generally
According to Harvard University's Henry Louis Gates, Jr., "the is-
sue of speech management arises in the highly contested matter of
'public forum': where may one exercise these supposedly valuable
rights of free speech? How much (if any) access to these forums will
we enjoy?"8" Developed under the First Amendment, 83 the public fo-
rum doctrine essentially dictates when, where, and under which con-
ditions individuals may engage in expressive conduct on public prop-
erty.s4 While the general principle seems relatively understandable,
81 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 21, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. (No. 00-
392). SEPTA essentially won Storti by arguing that its primary function was to deliver
passengers safely and efficiently, not to protect or promote expression. See Storti v.
S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *29-30 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 10, 1999) ("SEPTA has articulated and offered evidence to support specific and
important reasons for its view that platforms and paid areas should be dedicated exclu-
sively to transit use."), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002); see also Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682 (1992) (stating that one cannot argue "that an airport terminal
has as a principal purpose promoting 'the free exchange of ideas"' (quoting Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
82 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Truth or Consequences: Putting Limits on Limits, in THE
LIMITS OF ExPRESSION IN AMERICAN INTELLECTrUAL LIFE 15, 16 (Am. Council of
Learned Soc'ys Occasional Paper No. 22, 1993).
83 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press .... ). In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925),
the Supreme Court affirmed that the First Amendment was binding against the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, as a state agency under Pennsyl-
vania law, SEPTA must abide by the First Amendment. See 74 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1701-
1785 (1994) (establishing SEPTA by state fiat).
84 See generally DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLY
30-42 (1994) (offering a particularly helpful overview of the public forum doctrine);
THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 254-89 (3d ed. 1997)
(same).
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navigating the doctrine's "murk[y] waters, 85 has never been easy. Al-
though public forum doctrine has existed in its present tripartite
form-traditional public forum, designated public forum, and non-
public forum-since 1983,6 inchoate forum analysis extends back
over sixty years.87 In Hague v. CIO, the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for the modern notion of the traditional public forum by
holding that public streets and parks shall remain free for "assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. '88 Because "use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens,"8 9 the government may not prohibit expressive
conduct in those sacred areas; it may regulate activity only so far as
necessary to maintain public order and to preserve the express pur-
pose of the place in question.90 Two years later, in the 1941 decision
of Cox v. New Hampshire, the Court first dictated the specific extent to
which government may regulate these open forums. 9 In finding that
a group ofJehovah's Witnesses should have obtained a parade permit
as required by statute before marching on public streets, the Court
held that reasonable "time, place, and manner" regulations applied in
a neutral fashion were wholly constitutional under the First Amend-
ment.9 The principles from this core set of cases ultimately evolved
into the notion of the traditional public forum .
Gates, supra note 82, at 16.
86 See Perry Educ. Ass'n V. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(distinguishing among traditional, designated, and nonpublic forums for the purposes
of forum analysis).
87 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (Roberts, J., in one of three opin-
ions supporting the result) (striking down a municipal ordinance mandating permits
for assembling in the city's public streets and parks).
88 Id. at 515.
89 Id.
90 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (citing Hague and specifying
that the government may regulate speakers' conduct lawfully).
91 See 312 U.S. 569, 576-78 (1941) (upholding a state statute requiring the acquisi-
tion of a parade permit and the payment of a nominal fee to pay for security and main-
tenance of order during the proceedings).
91 Id. at 576; see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (finding a
circulation ordinance invalid because it contains "no restriction in its application with
respect to time or place"). Although the cases resulted in verdicts of a different stripe,
Lovell is nonetheless the logical precursor to the more forceful Cox.
93 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (defining the traditional public forum).
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B. Traditional Public Forum
First of the three forums described by the Court in 1983 in Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, the traditional public fo-
rum occupies a sacrosanct position in forum doctrine in that the gov-
ernment may not ban all expressive conduct in these constitutionally
holy locales.94 Under traditional public forum analysis, courts shall
apply a strict scrutiny test to determine whether a governmental re-
striction on expressive conduct may stand.95  Essentially, "[the gov-
ernment] may... enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner
of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication. 9"
1. "Time, Place, and Manner"
With "time, place, and manner," the Court merely lifted key lan-
guage from Cox v. New Hampshire to permit expression restrictions on
traditional public forums based on important public interests.97 Un-
der this test, "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expres-
sion is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time."98 Although courts typically approach First
Amendment restrictions with profuse skepticism, they are more will-
94 See id. (describing further limitations on governmental action within the con-
fines of a traditional public forum).
95 See id. (concluding that courts shall judge governmental regulations on a tradi-
tional public forum by a standard of strict scrutiny).
96 Id. The Court has delineated the various terms of the test to be used in evaluat-
ing a public forum speech. See also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (holding that mailboxes are not traditionally a
public forum); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
530, 535 (1980) ("[T]he essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the rec-
ognition that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate le-
gitimate governmental goals."); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16
(1972) (considering the "weighty reasons" for which a municipal government may
limit the right to demonstrate on a public sidewalk near a school); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (holding that the right to "peacefully... impart his
view to others" protected an individual who chose to play a phonograph record criticiz-
ing all organized religions at a volume that did not disturb the public in any way);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 167 (1939) (finding the municipal interest in prevent-
ing fraud insufficient to justify requiring government authorization to distribute pam-
phlets to private homes).
See KENT R. MIDDLETON & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION 67-71 (1988) (providing an overview of "time, place, and manner"
regulations under public forum analysis).
98 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
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ing to give the green light to regulations that simply funnel speech
into proper times and locations rather than limit or modify its sub-
stance. Hence, courts generally "balance freedom of expression
against such public interests as health, safety, the smooth flow of traf-
fic, and a pleasing environment"''m as they take into account "the 'na-
ture of the place' and the pattern of its normal activities."''
a. Content-Neutral
With regard to the "time, place, and manner" test itself, courts
must consider four factors in evaluating the constitutionality of a par-
ticular regulation. First, a time, place, and manner restriction may
not discriminate as to the communicative content itself or as to the be-
liefs of the communicator.' Through imposing this "content-
neutral" requirement, the Supreme Court ensures that government
does not "act[] as censor, undertak[ing] selectively to shield the pub-
lic from some kinds of speech on the [arbitrary] ground that they are
more offensive than others."' 3
In Heffton v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., for
example, the Court upheld a "time, place, and manner" restriction
because it did not touch on the content of the material that Krishnas
attempted to distribute to Minnesota state fair attendees. 104 However,
in the Christ's Bride case, the Third Circuit declared SEPTA's decision
to remove pro-life advertisements from its station walls unconstitu-
tionally violated the content-neutral portion of the test.'0 5 Thus, in the
09 See MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 97, at 67 (evaluating American
courts' position on "time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech).
'oo Id. at 70.
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027,1042 (1969)).
02 See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("A State or mu-
nicipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and man-
ner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content." (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 209.
104 See 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) ("[Tlhe [riule applies evenhandedly to all who
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds. No person or organiza-
tion, whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except
from a booth rented for those purposes.").
See Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255
(3d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he government 'may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debat-
ing in public facilities."' (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972))).
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SEPTA-TPI Metro PA situation, the question would revolve around
whether SEPTA's exclusion of all newspapers but Metro constitutes a
regulation based on content. 
°
0
b. Compelling government interest
Second, typical of strict scrutiny tests, a "time, place, and manner"
restriction must serve a significant, compelling, or important govern-
mental interest.' °7 Under this hypothetically broad umbrella, the
Court has placed interests such as ensuring the public health,
maintaining of public order, and providing for the regular operations
of government entities."' To rely on Heffron once more, the Court
valued the state's significant interest in pedestrian traffic flow and
safety above the Krishnas' First Amendment right to circulate pam-
phlets to state fair attendees.9 Recognizing that the Court has cate-
gorized the management of crowd traffic flow at a state fair a signifi-
cant government interest, one must look to the SEPTA scenario and
ask if SEPTA could invoke orderly crowd movement in a public transit
system as a significant government interest in restricting newspaper
distribution, where the government agency has already permitted the
distribution of one newspaper.""
106 This query, of course, only matters if a court determines that platforms and
paid areas are traditional public forums or designated public forums, though not non-
public forums. This distinction will be discussed in depth. Infra Part II.C-D.
107 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) ("We have often approved [of 'time, place, and manner'] restric-
tions... provided that ... they serve a significant governmental interest .. ").
108 See MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 97, at 69-70 (exploring the "signifi-
cant government interest" requirement in terms of "time, place, and manner" restric-
tions).
109 See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650-53 (classifying the state's interests in crowd control
and public safety as significant government objectives).
10 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never specifically classified crowd flow and
safety in a public transit system as a significant government interest, though it has done
so in the context of an airport terminal. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684 (1992) (holding that, although NewYork City airports are not
public forums, the government had a compelling state interest in ensuring "the nor-
mal flow of traffic" in an airport where "[dielays may be particularly costly"). This is
not to say that the Court would automatically analogize airports to public transit sys-
tems, as in the latter fares cost substantially less and transportation options are more
frequent if a delay results in a missed bus or trolley.
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c. Narrow tailoring
Examined in tandem with the second "time, place, and manner"
criterion, the third factor mandates that a limiting regulation be nar-
rowly tailored to accomplish a significant government interest; in
other words, the government may impose only the "narrowest" of re-
strictions to meet a compelling state goal. 11 Because this Comment
specifically deals with newspaper distribution (albeit in a public transit
system), it will prove helpful to study briefly this factor as applied to
newspaper boxes.
In another case involving Philadelphia-area newspaper distribu-
tion, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough of Swarthmore,"2 a federal
district court considered the constitutionality of a Swarthmore, Penn-
sylvania, municipal ordinance that almost completely barred newspa-
per boxes from the city's public sidewalks.' 3 Contending that the
borough's significant interests in stemming the tide of commercializa-
tion and in maintaining unhampered pedestrian passageways vindi-
cated the restrictive statute, Swarthmore's representatives sought to
prove the old adage that the ends justified the means.14 In legal
terms, they tried to convince the court that the regulation was nar-
rowly tailored to meet compelling city objectives. Although the court
ultimately did categorize aesthetic preservation and safe pedestrian
movement as significant government interests,"' it struck down the
ordinance on the basis that the ordinance did not fit those important
goals narrowly enough.""
Thus, in order to classify paid areas, platforms, and transit vehicles
as a public forum in a SEPTA-style situation, a court would have to de-
termine that the agency's contract with the publisher to limit distribu-
tion to Metro only is sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster in
light of the agency's stated interests in providing safe, efficient transit
Il1 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(specifying the requirement that the government narrowly tailor regulations restricting
speech to meet compelling government interests).
112 381 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
113 See id. at 235-36 (describing the ordinance at issue).
114 See id. at 242-43 (describing Swarthmore's justifications for the existence of
such a restrictive distribution ordinance).
115 Id. at 244.
116 See id. at 243-44 (holding the ordinance violative of the First Amendment be-
cause it did not pass the strict scrutiny test). For a lovely description of this case, see
MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 97, at 71.
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and maintaining orderly traffic flow. Yet, these rationales could very
well fly out the window if a court noticed that SEPTA itself permitted
distribution of one newspaper-the Metro--in seeming opposition to
these undoubtedly important principles.
d. "Ample alternative means of communication"
According to the Court in Perry, the final piece of the "time, place,
and manner" strict scrutiny test involves whether "ample alternative
means of communication" exist. A regulation cannot stand in a
public forum if the communicator does not have other adequate wayss. 118
to reach a particular audience. With regard to the case that
spawned this triumviral forum doctrine, the Perry Court examined a
collective-bargaining agreement between a town's board of education
and a union that had been elected as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for the school district's teachers.11 9 Under the terms of the
agreement, the union would gain exclusive access to the district's in-
terschool mail system and to teacher mailboxes. A rival union sued
the elected union and several members of the school board on the
grounds that the representative union's preferential access to the dis-
trict's mail system violated the First Amendment."' Although the
Court decided that the mail system was a nonpublic forum in which
"time, place, and manner" concerns matter substantially less,12 2 the
Court nonetheless fleshed out why the rival union had "ample alterna-
tive means of communication."1 23 Through "means rang[ing] from
bulletin boards to meeting facilities to the United States mail," the
Court wrote that "[the rival union] is assured of equal access to all
117 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (setting forth a final permissible method by which the
government may restrict expressive conduct in a public forum).
118 See MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, supra note 97, at 71 ("[A] time, place, and
manner restriction is permissible only if there are sufficient alternative channels of
communication to the one restricted.").
119 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 38-41 (defining the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement).
120 See id. at 40 (explicating the contractual terms giving one union exclusive ac-
cess to the district's teachers within district facilities).
121 See id. at 41 (illustrating the rival union's embryonic forum argument).
122 See id. at 46 (categorizing the interschool mail system as a nonpublic forum).
This Comment soon discusses a nonpublic forum in contrast to the two types of public
forums. Infra Part II.C.
123 See Peny, 460 U.S. at 53 (showing why, even if the Court were to apply the "time,
place, and manner" test used in restrictions on communication in public forums, the
collective bargaining agreement would pass constitutional muster).
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modes of communication."
124
Returning once more to the agreement between SEPTA and TPI
Metro PA, one must ask if the exclusivity provision of the contract
leaves open ample alternative means of communication for the news-
papers to reach SEPTA riders.
2. Import
Whether a court were to classify SEPTA's paid areas, platforms,
and transit vehicles as a public forum is of key significance. Because
"access rights have been enforced most vigilantly in the.., public fo-
rum, " 125 it tremendously behooves the established newspapers to show
that SEPTA indeed created some type of a public forum.
C. Nonpublic Forum
At the other end of the Peny forum spectrum sits the nonpublic
forum. 126 "[Nonpublic forums] consist of publicly owned facilities that
have been dedicated to use for either communicative or noncommu-
nicative purposes, but that have never been designated for indiscrimi-
nate expressive activity by the general public."127 Simply put, nonpub-
lic forums comprise all government property that is not a traditional
public forum or a designated public forum. Starting from the prem-
ise that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government,' 2 9 the
Perry Court remarked that the government "may reserve [a nonpublic
forum] for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
124 Id.; see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (holding that a restriction
barring political campaigning on a military base was valid because "members of the
Armed Forces stationed at Fort Dix are wholly free as individuals to attend political ral-
lies, out of uniform and off base"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974) (up-
holding a prohibition on prisoners' providing face-to-face interviews with the media, as
the prisoners could communicate with the media via mail and through visitors)., DOM CARISTI, EXPANDING FREE EXPRESSION IN THE MARKETPLACE 49 (1992).
126 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (describing the notion of the nonpublic forum).
.7 SMOLLA, supra note 41, at 210.
128 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (defining the nonpublic forum by the process of elimi-
nation). The designated public forum is an appellation that will be discussed in the
following section, Part IID.
129 United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
129 (1981).
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speaker's view." Broadly stated, the test allows the government to
restrict expression within a nonpublic forum, provided that the regu-
lation is "viewpoint neutral and 'reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum." 13 ' The Court has included as nonpublic forums
(and thus upheld regulations restricting expressive conduct with re-
gard to) military bases, 3 2 airport terminals, 33 and even charity
drives.
3
1
In Perry, the Court held that because the school district's inter-
school mail system qualified as a nonpublic forum, a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the board of education and an elected
teachers' union constitutionally could exclude all other unions from
access to the mail system.' 35 "Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic
forum," the Perry Court wrote, "is the right to make distinctions in ac-
cess on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinc-
tions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and in-
escapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities
compatible with the intended purpose of the property.,131
Although the restriction at issue in Perry initially appears startlingly
similar to the restrictive access situation involving SEPTA and TPI
Metro PA, one can distinguish between the two scenarios quite clearly.
30 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
31 Christ's Bride Ministries v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)).
132 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (holding that a policy barring po-
litical campaigning on a military base is valid).'33
See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 692-93
(1992) (declaring that restrictions on expression in New York City airport terminals
may be constitutional); AdantaJournal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Dep't of Avia-
tion, 277 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding summarily that an airport
qualifies as a nonpublic forum).
134 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (holding that the Combined Federal Campaign,
an annual appeal to federal employees for charitable contributions, was a nonpublic
forum).
135 See Pery, 460 U.S. at 48 ("Because the school mail system is not a public forum,
the School District had no 'constitutional obligation per se to let any organization use
the school mail boxes."' (quoting Conn. State Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Mem-
bers, 538 F.2d 471, 481 (2d Cir. 1976)).
136 d. at 49. Nonetheless, when the government restricts speech in a nonpublic
forum, it may not do so in an "'arbitrary, capricious or invidious"' fashion. United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-26 (1990) (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974)); see also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) ("When First Amendment compliance is the point to be
proved, the risk of non-persuasion---operative in all trials-must rest with the Govern-
ment....").
2002] 1993
1994 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1969
The SEPTA matter involves newspaper distribution rather than pam-
phlet circulation among interschool mailboxes. Moreover, SEPTA has
retained editorial control over distributed materials, whereas the in-
terschool mail system in Perry merely acted as a conduit for the un-
ion's transmission of information. As to specific forum determination
in the SEPTA-TPI Metro PA matter, the more difficult question would
involve reconciling the federal district court's classification of SEPTA's
paid areas and platforms in Storti v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transpor-
tation Authority as nonpublic forums137 with the theory that the estab-
lished newspapers should nonetheless enjoy the same access to paid
areas and platforms that Metro does. 38
D. Designated Public Forum
1. Overview
Situated between the traditional public forum and the nonpublic
forum in Perry's tripartite forum scheme, the designated public forum
shares much in common with the traditional public forum, but it oc-
cupies a more tenuous place in the realm of free expression on public
property."9 Superficially, the main difference between a traditional
public forum and a designated public forum may be stated as follows:
"The Court has found some areas to be public forums because they
have traditionally been used by Americans for speech activities. Other
areas have become public forums.., because governments... have
allowed speech activities to take place there." 140 However, once the
government intentionally opens property to the public for expressive
conduct, the same strict standards that apply to governmental regula-
tions apply to regulations in a traditional public forum. Thus, in in-
137 See No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999)
(classifying paid areas and platforms as nonpublic forums for leafletting purposes),
affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
1073 (2002).
138 See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing fully the difference between Storti and Philadel-
phia Newspapers, and illustrating that newspaper distribution is distinguishable from
handbilling, even though the public property at issue is the same).
139 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (explaining that the government is "not required to in-
definitely retain the open character" of designated public forums); see also CARISTI, su-
pra note 125, at 66 ("[T~he government need not keep [designated public forums]
open indefinitely .... ); G. Sidney Buchanan, Toward a Unified Theory of Governmental
Power to Regulate Protected Speech, 18 CONN. L. REV. 531, 569 (1986) (explaining that
there is no guaranteed right of public access to a "nontraditional forum" such as a des-
ignated public forum).
140 MCWHIRTER, supra note 84, at 33.
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vertising space by "'expressly' dedicating its advertising space to
'speech activity." 47 A subset of the designated public forum, the lim-
ited public forum is "open only to certain kinds of expression."'
48
Therefore, in Christ's Bride, the court deemed the station's. advertising
space a limited public forum because it pertained only to advertising.
The idea of a limited public forum will prove exceedingly useful in
distinguishing the SEPTA-TPI Metro PA case from Storti, in which the
federal district court held that paid areas and platforms do not consti-
tute public forums for the purposes of leafletting.'
49
Even within the' confines of what looks like a limited public forum,
the Supreme Court has indicated that the real distinction is between
"general access" and "selective access.",5 0 If the government has per-
mitted a particular class of communicators to have "general access" to
property, it has created a designated public forum. Widmar again
provides the best example of a government entity providing "general
access" to a certain group of speakers.'52 If, however, the government
has done "no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a
particular class of speakers, whose members must then ... 'obtain
permission' to use it," then it has permitted only "selective access" and
has not created a designated public forum. For Philadelphia's es-
tablished newspapers, this hurdle would have proven slightly more
substantial to overcome, as the SEPTA Rules Relating to Constitutionally
147 Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248 (3d
Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990)).
148 Id. at 249; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 830 (1995) (deeming a student activities fund a limited public forum); Kreimer v.
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering a public library a
limited public forum for "reading, writing and quiet contemplation," as opposed to
"oral and interactive" expressive conduct).
149 SeeStorti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at
*29 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999) (ruling SEPTA's paid areas and platforms nonpublic fo-
rums with regard to handbilling), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished ta-
ble decision), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002).
150 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1998)
(discussing designated public forum in terms of the distinction between "'general ac-
cess"' and "'selective access"' (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 803, 805 (1985))).
151 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 679-80 (defining "general access" in
light of public forum analysis).152 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (holding that a state university
making its meeting facilities generally available to student groups transforms the prop-
erty into a designated public forum).
153 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 679-80 (drawing a distinction be-
tween "'general access"' and "'selective access,"' which typically does not lead to the
creation of a public forum (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804)).
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vestigating the designated public forum, the umbilical query revolves
around whether the government has transformed a nonpublic forum
into a designated public forum. 4
To understand how government transforms a nonpublic forum
into a designated public forum, one must study several examples of
designated public forums, categorized as such because the govern-
ment has changed their character. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme
Court struck down the University of Missouri at Kansas City's policy
barring religious groups from using its meeting facilities. 4 2 Although
the state university's meeting facilities certainly did not qualify as a
traditional public forum, 43 the Court believed that once the university
made its facilities available to student groups generally, the facilities
turned into a public forum such that the university could not dis-
criminate at the expense of religious groups.1 4 The lesson from Wid-
mar is that once the government creates a public forum, it may not
pick and choose communicators based on the speaker's viewpoint or
the content of the speech; 4 5 moreover, the strict scrutiny test applies
all the same.146
2. Limited Public Forum
Significant as a case involving SEPTA, Christ's Bride differs from
Widmar because the particular forum at issue is different. The Third
Circuit held that the public transit agency created a designated public
forum-or, more specifically, a limited public forum-in station ad-
141 The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated; it could prove disposi-
tive with regard to the SEPTA-TPI Metro PA contract. See SMOLLA, supra note 41, at
211 ("The difficulty in modem public forum law is determining whether a facility falls
within [the designated public forum appellation], and is thus subject to strict scrutiny,
or [the nonpublic forum category], and is thus subject to the significantly more lax
reasonable nexus test.").
142 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (finding that the university
could not exclude religious groups from meeting facilities once the university had
opened them to other groups).
143 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (discounting summarily the notion that the univer-
sity's meeting facilities were a traditional public forum). The meeting facilities cer-
tainly do not resemble the "streets and public places" at issue in Hague. Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
144 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5 (explaining the rationale for deeming the meet-
ing facilities a designated public forum).
145 Id. at 269-70; see also MCWHIRTER, supra note 84, at 33 ("The one thing gov-
ernment may not do is allow one group to use an area for speech activities and deny
access to other groups.").
146 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(providing the constitutional standard for regulations in a designated public forum).
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Protected Activities do not ban newspaper distribution outright in the
system as a whole.15 4 Nonetheless, SEPTA's very own sponsorship of
an exclusive newspaper-as well as its relegation of newspapers to
"free" areas-might have provided the necessary legal boosts.
E. Defining the Forum in Question
Although determining exactly how the government creates a pub-
lic forum remains ambiguous, it is clear that a court shall define the
forum at issue by the "access sought by the speaker."'55 This inquiry
serves both to demarcate the disputed forum and to avoid either per-
mitting or prohibiting government regulations on expressive conduct
in an overly expansive area. 156 Thus, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
the Supreme Court winnowed down the forum in question from a
public transit system as a whole to the advertising card space on the
side of city buses.'" Similarly, in the Christ's Bride case, rather than de-
fining the contested forum as SEPTA's entire Suburban Station, the
court determined that the parties battled over a significantly more
limited area: SEPTA's advertising space.158
Because courts have typically reduced the size of the contested fo-
rum, the Supreme Court has never applied public forum analysis to a
subway or rail system as a whole, nor to its paid areas and platforms.5 9
154 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 6 (allowing, theoretically, newspaper distri-
bution by permit in "specified locations within designated areas" of the SEPTA sys-
tem). Even though the Rules leave open the possibility of access to "designated" areas,
they foreclose access to paid areas and platforms. Thus, SEPTA's permissive stance is
entirely empty.
15 CARISTI, supra note 125, at 45; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (deciding that
the Combined Federal Campaign-not the whole federal workplace-was the forum in
question).
16 See generally Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (rationalizing implicitly the definition of a
forum based on access sought by the speaker).
157 See 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (delineating narrowly the disputed forum).
158 See Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248
(3d Cir. 1998) (determining that SEPTA created a designated public forum in its ad-
vertising space).
19 Although the Court has never applied forum analysis to an entire public transit
system, it has, as evidenced by Lehman, employed the analysis with respect to different
facets of a transit system. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303 (focusing only on bus advertising
space). Generally, courts in transit cases examine whether the government can regu-
late communicative activities within station and vehicle advertising spaces, as well as in
displays. See, e.g., N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding, similarly to Lehman, that the "advertising space on the outside of buses
is a designated public forum"); Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 655-
56 (2d Cir. 1995) (narrowing the relevant public forum from Penn Station as a whole
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Recently, however, the Court aberrantly deemed New York City air-
port terminals the relevant forum at issue, holding that those termi-
nals are nonpublic forums in which the government has substantial
leeway to regulate expressive activity.' 60 Closer to home, the federal
district court in Storti appeared to analogize to Lee in declaring that
paid areas and platforms-the very forum in question in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority'6 -
constituted the relevant forums for analysis. 6 2 There is, therefore, lit-
tle question that the relevant forums with regard to the SEPTA-TPI
Metro PA exclusive distribution contract are SEPTA's paid areas (in-
cluding transit vehicles) and platforms. The pivotal inquiry, once
again, would revolve around whether SEPTA created a designated
public forum for the purposes of newspaper distribution.
F. Creating a Designated Public Forum
Deductively, virtually any public forum that the government ac-
tively creates will be a designated public forum; traditional public fo-
rums are indeed "traditional" because the government need not act
affirmatively to permit them to exist.13 To state a difficult proposition
to one billboard in particular); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dept. of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144,
1151-52 (7th Cir. 1995) (determining that an airport diorama display case, rather than
the entire concourse, comprised the forum at hand).
lW See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992)
(considering the constitutionality of handbilling and solicitation restrictions in airport
terminals). Ultimately, the Court upheld the solicitation regulations but refused to
rule on the leafleting provisions, since a prior case disposed of the matter. Id. at 685.
161 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 18, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v.
S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with author)
(pointing to "SEPTA's stations and transit vehicles" as the relevant forums).
162 See Storti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at
*21-22 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999) (declaring that it is "reasonable" to "assume that it is
the paid areas and/or platforms themselves" that comprise "the proper unit for forum
analysis"), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002).
163 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."); see also SMOLLA, supra
note 41, at 209 ("[T]he government is not permitted to avoid the reach of [strict scru-
tiny] by 'privatizing' its traditional open forums."). The statement, of course, does not
include the possibility of a government building a park or paving a new sidewalk, in
which case both would count as traditional public forums by their nature. See
TEDFORD, supra note 84, at 264 (describing the special nature of "quintessential" pub-
lic forums).
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succinctly, "[w]hat triggers the public forum is its deliberate use as a
place for the exchange of views among members of the public."164 In a
case involving a school principal's prior review and ultimate deletion
of articles from a public high school student newspaper, the Supreme
Court provided its most pristine explanation of how the government
creates a public forum. 6  Determining in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier that the relevant forum at issue consisted of public school
facilities, the Court expressed the view that public school facilities be-
come a public forum "only if school authorities have 'by policy or by
practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general
public' or by some segment of the public." 66 The Court's "policy or
practice" language necessarily requires an analysis of the govern-
ment's "intent with regard to the forum in question,"' 67 as "[a] desig-
nated public forum is created because the government so intends."' 68
However, as the Third Circuit has suggested, the government's
stated intent is not alone dispositive when determining whether it has
created a public forum.' 69 In its intent inquiry, the court must ask
whether the government entity has "expressly" devoted the relevant
forum to "speech activity."'"0 While neither official passivity nor toler-
ance of "limited discourse" automatically establishes a public forum, 7'
the mere fact that the government has placed restrictions on a fo-
rum's use does not categorically signify that the government has in-
tended to classify the forum as nonpublic. 72 Perhaps the government
has either imposed valid "time, place, and manner" regulations 7
3 or
164 WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 40 (1988).
165 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,269-70 (1988).
166Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 47 (1983)).
167 Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248 (3d
Cir. 1998).
168 Jd. at 248.
169 See Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1374 (3d Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that the fact that the government has expressly retained control over a forum's
categorization through its policy statements does not alone resolve the forum issue). If
the government's statement of intent were indeed authoritative, then it could keep a
forum closed merely by stating its desire to do so. Moreover, courts could take into
account neither the government's contradictory policies and practices nor inferred
intent.
170 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (plurality opinion).
1 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
1 See Christ's Bride, 148 F.3d at 249-50 (explaining the metamorphosis of a non-
public forum into a public one).
173 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (permitting such regula-
tions in public forums). See generally supra Part II.B. (discussing valid restrictions in
19992002]
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formed a limited public forum "open only to certain kinds of expres-
sion."74
In situations in which the government has not explicitly expressed
its desire to open a forum to a certain mode of expression, courts may
infer intent from a government entity's actions.7 5 Courts will most
frequently "infer an intent on the part of the government to create a
public forum where the government's justification for the exclusion of
certain expressive conduct is unrelated to the forum's purpose.
" 76
In a quintessential designated public forum case, the Court held
in Widmar v. Vincent that a state university's action of opening school
meeting facilities to all student groups implicitly created a public fo-
rum such that the school could not bar religious groups from using
the facilities. Thus, a government entity need not provide an "unmis-
takably clear" statement of its desire to construct a public forum.'77
III. THE SEPTA ANGLE
A. Did SEPTA Create a Designated Public Forum?
1. Parameters
As the Third Circuit aptly commented in Christ's Bride, most "diffi-
cult is the question whether SEPTA has created a designated public
forum" 78 such that it may not exclude other newspapers from its paid
areas and platforms. Although the district court's injunction denial
intimates that SEPTA did not establish a public forum by cooperating
with TPI Metro PA,' 79 a district court's injunction denial certainly does
public forums).
174 Christ's Bride, 148 F.3d at 249.
175 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (ruling that a state university
created a public forum via its permissive actions).
176 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg'l
Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 351 (6th Cir. 1998).
177 Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit pur-
suant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only if it provides an "unmistakably
clear" statement of its intent to do so. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989)
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). In examining
governmental intent in public forum analysis, the bottom line remains that courts re-
quire far less explicit language.
178 148 F.3d at 248.
179 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 00-392, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1160, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2000) ("Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of
demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits."). None-
theless, Judge Kelly also wrote that "[t] his does not mean that Plaintiffs will be unable
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not dictate how future courts would or should rule on the merits of a
case. Although the Storti court already defined SEPTA's paid areas
and platforms as nonpublic forums with respect to handbilling,"' Storti
would not control in this scenario because its result applies only to the
leafletting provision of the SEPTA Rules Relating to Constitutionally Pro-
tected Activities-not to the Rules' provision restricting the "Sale of
Newspapers and Other Written Materials."' 8' More specifically,
through the concept of the limited public forum, the government can
establish a designated public forum by making property generally
available to a defined class of speakers;82 theoretically, newspaper dis-
tributors could circulate materials freely, whereas pamphleteers could
not. These preliminary conclusions, however, serve only to permit a
broader inquiry into the SEPTA-TPI Metro PA contract, as well as
SEPTA's actions and manifested intent. The results show that SEPTA
implicitly illustrated its intent to create a public forum by exclusively
circulating a full-service newspaper over which it retained full editorial
control.
2. SEPTA Did Not Express Intent to Open a Public Forum
In terms of express intent, SEPTA certainly did not state an inten-
tion to open a forum to all newspapers when it promulgated the
SEPTA Rules Relating to Constitutionally Protected Activities on January 27,
1999.183 If anything, SEPTA officials nakedly displayed their desire to
ultimately to prevail on the merits." Id.
1s0 See Storti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at
*25 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999) (deeming SEPTA's paid areas and platforms nonpublic
forums for the purposes of leafleting and similar activities), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d
Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002).
181 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 6-7 (regulating the distribution of publica-
tions, "including the sale of newspapers or other written material through 'honor'
boxes or other similar units"). The Storti plaintiffs challenged solely the anti-
handbilling provision of the Rules. Recall that the government can create a limited
public forum and open that forum only with respect to certain types of expressive con-
duct, or to a class of speakers. Simply because the government opens a forum to one
mode of communicative activity does not signify that the disputed forum can withstand
all constitutionally protected communicative activities. But see supra notes 142-45 and
accompanying text (discussing a case that holds that once a public forum is created the
government cannot exclude a group based on the content of the speech or the
speaker's viewpoint).
182 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1998) (dis-
cussing designated public forums in terms of the distinction between "'general access"'
and "'selective access'" (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 803, 805 (1985))).
183 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 6-7 (limiting newspaper distribution
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keep paid areas and platforms closed forums, relying heavily on safety
and crowd-flow concerns. Is8 Moreover, the Rules' Preamble clearly
evinces the agency's intent to "permit certain expressive activities," but
only to the extent that they do not interfere with "SEPTA's primary
function to provide a fast, reliable, and economical transportation sys-
tem."18 5 In Storti, SEPTA prevailed by arguing that agency regulations
were intricately connected to this aim;" essentially, SEPTA did not
dedicate paid areas and platforms to "the promotion of expression."'8 '
Consistent with the agency's transit and safety goals, SEPTA itself
could (and does) constitutionally distribute schedules and route maps
in paid areas and on platforms. Similarly, if SEPTA had not granted
TPI Metro PA the exclusive right to distribute a newspaper over which
SEPTA retained editorial control, the government agency undoubt-
edly could constitutionally bar all newspaper distribution on its plat-
forms and in its paid areas. As in Storti, a federal district court would
likely uphold the provision of the Rules restricting newspaper distribu-
tion in light of pressing safety, security, and traffic flow rationales-
not to mention SEPTA's "primary function" of operating an efficient
transit system.- Looking to the Supreme Court's decision in Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, a lower court would
probably analogize the airport terminal considered in that case to a
public transit system's paid areas and platforms and reach the conclu-
sion that they constituted nonpublic forums for the purpose of news-
paper distribution.8 9 If only SEPTA hadn't thrown a newsprint-laden
throughout the SEPTA system through strict permit and location restrictions).
See id. at 2 (citing security and pedestrian traffic as overwhelming objectives be-
hind the Rules).
185 Id. at 1.
186 See Storti v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 99-2159, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at
*26, *29-30 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999) (justifying the agency's handbilling restriction by
looking to "SEPTA's interests in ensuring passenger safety and maintaining unhin-
dered pedestrian traffic flow on the narrow and confined platforms" and by conclud-
ing that paid areas and platforms "'don't count among their purposes the "free ex-
change of ideas""' (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 686 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring))), affd, 265 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 2001) (un-
published table decision), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1073 (2002).
187 See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 682 (recognizing that the objective of a
public airport terminal was "the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion
of expression").
s See Storti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14515, at *17-18 (invoking Krishna Consciousness
to categorize SEPTA's platforms and paid areas as nonpublic forums for the purpose
of leafletting).
189 See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 682 (looking to the essential character of
the forum to determine its categorization). This designation assumes that a public
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wrench into the pristine hypothetical.
3. SEPTA Implied Its Intent to Open a Public Forum
By entering into a deal with TPI Metro PA to distribute Metro ex-
clusively within the confines of the SEPTA system, and by retaining
editorial control over the publication, SEPTA completely changed the
character of the disputed forum by itself engaging in "the promotion
of expression. "19 Accordingly, SEPTA may exclude other publishers
from circulating their newspapers only through valid, content-neutral
"time, place, and manner" regulations.' 1 Although the government
agency manifested no express intent to open the forum to other
newspaper distributors, its actions-its "'policy [and] practice 
' -
imply exactly the opposite.
In its RFP, SEPTA called upon an external publisher to "provide a
rider publication, which promotes SEPTA services."
'93 If TPI Metro
PA incorporated that term alone into a contract with SEPTA, the dis-
tribution of a new publication likely would not have created a public
forum. SEPTA's intent and goal (and presumably the final product)
would have been sufficiently close to the stated purpose of the forum
to justify its own existence as well as the concurrent ban on other pub-
lications. However, both the RFP and the contract's terms reveal that
SEPTA entered the newspaper business lock, stock, and barrel, col-
lecting advertising revenues and retaining the final say over editorial
content. 94 By cooperating with TPI Metro PA, SEPTA shifted away
from its stipulated primary purpose of safely moving passengers to the
alternate goals of collecting revenues and, more importantly, promot-
ing expression.
transit system had not made a policy or practice of permitting distribution, only to
change the rules midstream. If the Court could hold that a multipurpose, shopping
mall-like public airport terminal constituted a nonpublic forum, then a lower court
would almost certainly conclude that the purpose-focused paid areas and platforms of
a transit system were no different.
19 See id. (using the purpose of "the promotion of expression" as a bellwether of
intent).
191 See supra Part II.B (discussing valid government regulations on expressive con-
duct in traditional public forums).
192 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (quoting Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
193 Request for Proposal, supra note 57.
194 See id. (requesting a publication that "generates revenue through the sale of
advertising"); id. at 10 ("Metro will conform to SEPTA's editorial standards of con-
tent.").
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4. Exclusive Distribution Deals and Triggering a Public Forum
May one extrapolate from this conclusion that a government
agency that enters into a similar exclusive distribution deal automati-
cally triggers the opening of a forum? Yes, but with one significant
exception: Civilian Enterprise Newspaper (CEN) contracts. The
Department of Defense may award exclusive CEN deals to private pub-
lishers to distribute newspapers to personnel on American military
bases. 6 Although these CEN contracts seem logically to create public
forums because of official "promotion of expression," 97 courts have
long upheld the validity of CENs in the face of the public forum doc-
trine.'98 Due to the unique nature of the military's objectives and the
traditional deference courts give to defense restrictions against ex-
pression,'99 "a special standard of review properly governs constitu-
tional challenges to military regulations."'00 National defense consid-
erations, including the need of commanding officers to communicate
with their troops, overwhelmingly justifies the preferential treatment
given to CENs; one could hardly argue that SEPTA's desire to reach its
passengers even rivals the military's absolute need for clear informa-
tion transmission.
195 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for a Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 24 n.12, Phila. Newspapers,
Inc. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 00-392) (on file with
author) (distinguishing CEN contracts from the TPI Metro PA-SEPTA contract).
196 See 32 C.F.R. § 247 (2001) (providing for CEN contracts in which the Depart-
ment of Defense contracts with a commercial, civil publisher to distribute exclusively
one newspaper on a military base, and allowing the newspaper to consist of both tradi-
tional news items and special military information).
197 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682 (1992)
(noting that "Port Authority management considers the purpose of the [airport] to be
the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion of expression").
198 See, e.g., Swarner v. United States, 937 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
CEN must have a preferred distribution status compared to other free newspapers to
accomplish the program's objectives."); Shopco Distrib. Co. v. Commanding General
of Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, N.C., 885 F.2d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1989) (validat-
ing the existence of a CEN in light of important military objectives); M.N.C. of Hi-
nesville, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 791 F.2d 1466, 1476 (lth Cir. 1986) ("'The CEN is
a special newspaper.' The military has an interest in distributing it to its personnel ma-
terial that is not otherwise readily available." (citation omitted)).
199 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that military bases are
nonpublic forums because "the business of a military installation ... [is] to train sol-
diers, not to provide a public forum").
200 Bryant v. Secretary of the Army, 862 F. Supp. 574, 579 (D.D.C. 1994).
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5. SEPTA's Exclusive Distribution Deal Opened a Public Forum
If "[w]hat triggers the public forum is its deliberate use as a place
for the exchange of views among members of the public,"20 ' then the
expansion of Metro's content beyond mere transit information and
even agency-bolstering propaganda to full news coverage, editorials,
and letters-to-the-editor sections demonstrates a substantial exchange
of views and thus opened the forum at least to newspaper distributors.
In short, when SEPTA inked the exclusive distribution deal, it implic-
itly devoted the forum to a certain type of speech activity-namely
newspaper production and distribution-and created a limited public
foru 202frum .
B. Does SEPTA 's Exclusion of All Newspapers
but Metro Withstand Strict Scrutiny?
Having created a limited public forum, SEPTA would now have to
pass the "time, place, and manner" strict scrutiny test for regulations
in a public forum in order for its Rules provision banning newspaper
2013distribution to pass constitutional muster. First, a court would have
204
to find that SEPTA's "place" regulation is content-neutral. Quite
obviously, SEPTA's actualization of this policy is anything but content-
neutral. Originally, SEPTA may have prohibited newspaper distribu-
tion in its paid areas and on its platforms based on genuine and com-
pelling safety and forum-purpose concerns.2 ' However, SEPTA offi-
cials completely contradicted these valid objectives when they
contracted with TPI Metro PA to distribute one newspaper to the ex-
clusion of all others and when they obtained editorial oversight of
Metro's content. Although SEPTA spokesman Jim Whitaker said that
SEPTA would "'have no control over anything [except a single page
devoted to SEPTA],' 2 °0 the deal clearly stipulated that "[e]ach issue
201 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining how the government can
open a forum).
202 See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing how a government
entity manifests its implicit intent to create a public forum).203
See supra Part II.B (setting forth the test for valid expression regulations in a
traditional public forum).
204 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("A State or mu-
nicipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and man-
ner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content.").
205 See SEPTA RuLES, supra note 16, at 1-2 (enumerating SEPTA's key interests in
promulgating the Rules).
206 Duffy, supra note 30, at 10.
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should provide SEPTA with significant editorial coverage and must
conform to SEPTA's editorial standards for content."20 7 Additionally,
the deal's financial terms inextricably tie SEPTA's share of the profits
to Metro's advertising success. 2°s Accordingly, by metamorphosing into
a full-fledged publisher, SEPTA gained a strong incentive to close its
system to other newspapers that would compete with Metro for readers
and advertising dollars-and to other newspapers that would take
SEPTA to task for mismanagement, irresponsible spending, and per-
haps even constitutional violations relating to expressive conduct. Es-
sentially, SEPTA officials could hardly contend that the Rules' mass
newspaper exclusion is content-neutral where they have prohibited
those newspapers for the very reason that they are not Metro.
Second and third, the excluding regulation must be narrowly tai-lore to eeta copeling . .200
ored to meet a compelling government objective. Taking the latter
portion before the former, one can reasonably conclude that SEPTA's
express interests in "protecting the physical safety of patrons," "provid-
ing an environment in which its patrons are free from undue distrac-
tion from their primary purpose for being there," and "in preserving
unobstructed, unimpeded, and orderly flow of pedestrian traffic" in-
deed constitute compelling objectives.2 10 Nonetheless, SEPTA's actu-
alization of the Rules' newspaper provision unmistakably does not nar-
rowly fit these important objectives. If SEPTA officials truly valued
these goals, and if they legitimately believed that a ban on newspaper
distribution in paid areas and on platforms would best serve to ac-
complish them, then why would they agree to the distribution of a
newspaper in the very areas they sought to protect? In other words,
can officials argue with a straight face that safety and crowd-flow con-
cerns are paramount when Metro's distribution potentially presents
the problems against which SEPTA expressly aimed to protect?"'
SEPTA's policies are highly inconsistent with its practice and are not
narrowly tailored to meet those compelling government objectives.
207 Request for Proposal, supra note 57.
208 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the financial terms of
SEPTA's contract with TPI Metro PA).
209 See supra notes 107, 111, and accompanying text (relating a strict scrutiny test
for regulations on expression in a public forum).
SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 1-2; see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-54 (1981) (classifying the state's interest in
crowd control'and public safety as significant government objectives).
211 Now that SEPTA has placed Metro distribution bins in the entranceways of
buses and subway-surface trolleys, pedestrian traffic flow is neither "unimpeded" nor
"unobstructed," as the Rules so explicitly mention. SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 2.
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Finally, regardless of whether SEPTA has provided "ample alterna-
tive means of communication, 2 12 the anti-distribution regulation fails
other portions of the strict scrutiny test. To wit, the agency likely did
provide adequate other modes of distribution for the excluded news-
papers. Although the established newspapers lost a "captive audi-
ence" of readers in the forum at issue, publishers could distribute
213their newspapers throughout SEPTA's free areas -not to mentionS 214
on public sidewalks immediately outside stations. Furthermore,
over Justice Douglas's impassioned dissent in Public Utilities Commission
v. Pollak,21 5 the Supreme Court declared that streetcar riders do not
qualify as a captive audience with regard to the broadcasting of radio
216programs in transit vehicles. Thus, one may fairly assume that
SEPTA riders similarly do not qualify as a captive audience for the
purposes of newspaper distribution; although they have but one
choice in the system, they need not even pick up a copy of the news-
paper, whereas radio transmissions automatically hit the ears of Wash-
ington streetcar riders.
In light of SEPTA's deal with TPI Metro PA to distribute Metro on
an exclusive basis in paid areas and on platforms (now public forums),
the agency-notwithstanding an out-of-court settlement removing the
case from court'--created restrictions on newspaper distribution thatshould not survive a court's scrutiny.
C. Public Policy Issues
The November 2001 out-of-court settlement between SEPTA and
the newspaper publishers put an indefinite brake on the Philadelphia
conflict. A federal district court has never heard and probably will
never hear the case on its merits. Nonetheless, Metro's publisher is
anxious to expand quickly into other major urban hubs, and Metro's
212 See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (describing the "ample alterna-
tive channels of communication" portion of the time, place, and manner test).
213 See SEPTA RULES, supra note 16, at 6-7 (providing for ways in which publishers
may distribute newspapers in stations' free areas).
214 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., in one of three opin-
ions supporting the result) (holding public streets and parks are traditional public fo-
rums).
215 See 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The streetcar audience
is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice.").
See id. at 464-66 (upholding the District of Columbia's practice of airing radio
programs through bus loudspeakers, making the programs audible to all aboard on
the grounds that the right to privacy is diminished when one rides in a public vehicle).
Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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troubles in the City of Brotherly Love have significantly impacted the
launches of transit dailies elsewhere. The SEPTA tussle has already
prompted the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority to eschew an ex-
clusive distribution deal with Metro's Boston publisher.9 Indeed,
Mort Zuckerman decided to distribute his Metro-rivaling Daily News Ex-
press-another commuter daily-well away from New York City's
Metro Transit Authority's platforms and paid areas2 ° Essentially, the
major newspapers' constitutional challenge to Metro's contract with
SEPTA has made public transit agencies and publishers far more hesi-
tant to sign exclusive distribution deals, not to mention ones that offer
a measure of editorial control to the transportation systems them-
selves.
All the same, the lure of replicating the success of Metro in Phila-
delphia may very well tempt publishers to team up with public transit
agencies, notwithstanding a high litigation risk. If a court were to
scrutinize such a deal on its merits and ultimately find that the public
transit agency violated the First Amendment by prohibiting newspaperS •221
distribution in a public forum after entering an exclusive deal, the
agency would face two options: (1) end its contract with the newspa-
per publisher, stop distribution of the newspaper within the system,
and constitutionally continue to ban newspapers from paid areas and
platforms; or (2) permit other newspapers into the system pursuant to
valid "time, place, and manner" regulations. With regard to the first
option, a government entity "may by designation move a public facil-
ity.., out of [designated public forum] status.",222 By way of example,
SEPTA may always dissolve the public forum by ceasing to distribute
Metro in the disputed forum.
Unless, however, a court were to issue an injunction against a
transit system to halt a commuter newspaper's circulation in paid ar-
eas and on platforms, an agency would almost certainly select the sec-
ond option. SEPTA, for instance, stood to lose financially if a court
effectively ended its contract with TPI Metro PA. Although this sce-
218 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (detailing MTG's expansion plans,
including an already established Boston Metro).
29 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (illustrating another public transit sys-
tem's fears emanating from the SEPTA-TPI Metro war).
220 See Bercovici, supra note 23 (discussing the distribution structure of the late
Daily News Express).
221
The forum inquiry would, of course, turn on a specific agency's expression
regulations. This analysis presumes a marked similarity to those of SEPTA.
222 SMOLLA, supra note 41, at 210 (footnote omitted).
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221nario adheres to a key principle of press freedom, it would also gen-
erate veritable safety and crowd-flow concerns. The influx of newspa-
per boxes underground surely would trigger alarms in the minds of
safety-conscious officials, who definitely would not want to face the
prospect of another costly jury verdict.224 To combat rampant expan-
sion, officials could impose "time, place, and manner" regulations that
fall in line with the strict scrutiny test for public forums. Such re-
sponses potentially could include a permit process with licensing
fees, 225 limits on the number of boxes a publisher places in the system,
and mandatory indemnification waivers. Although the number of
newspaper boxes would increase, the growth would foster journalistic
integrity by countering a public transit agency's propaganda and bol-
stering First Amendment values.
CONCLUSION
According to constitutional law scholar Rodney A. Smolla in Free
Speech in an Open Society, "[o]ne of the essential preconditions to free-
dom of speech in a society is the private ownership and control of most
mass media."22 6 SEPTA's contract with TPI Metro PA to distribute ex-
clusively in a public forum a newspaper over which the agency retains
full control curbs First Amendment freedoms and severely harms
journalistic ethics. Accordingly, when examining similar deals, courts
should guard against the infringement of these liberties by deeming
paid areas and platforms limited public forums. They should either
order public transit agencies to halt distribution of such commuter
223 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("'Liberty of circulating is
as essential to [freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing ... ' (quoting Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878))).
224 See supra notes 29, 55 and accompanying text (outlining SEPTA's precarious
financial status). It is highly conceivable that a rider could get injured in the course of
otherpassengers' attempts to take or buy newspapers as they move about a station.
Government agencies should take note, however, "'that a licensing fee is per-
missible, but a state or municipality may charge no more than the amount needed to
cover administrative costs."' Atlanta Journal and Constitution v. City of Atlanta Dep't
of Aviation, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 87, at *13 (11th Cir.Jan. 4, 2002) (quoting Sentinel
Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1205 (11th Cir. 1991)). Essentially, the
government may charge fees provided that it does "not profit by imposing licensing or
permit fees on the exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights." Id. Additionally, agency
personnel may not possess virtually unbridled discretion to accept or deny applica-
tions. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-70 (1988) (in-
validating an ordinance affording the mayor the right, without "explicit limits," to re-
ject applications to place newsracks on public property).
SMoLLA, supra note 41, at 209.
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dailies or hold that public transit agencies may not constitutionally bar
other newspapers from the disputed forum. By engaging in "the
promotion of expression," SEPTA changed the character of the forum
at issue. By entering into the contract with TPI Metro PA, the gov-
ernment agency struck a blow to freedom of expression-a fact that
should induce courts that subsequently referee comparable exclusivity
deals between Metro's publishers and public transit agencies to stop
the presses, Metro's.
